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ABSTRACT: Historical theory, as a mode of theoretical criticism, engages in both descriptive 
and prescriptive readings of historiographic practices, with a view to interpreting and 
evaluating their meaning as epistemological moves. But it also, often implicitly, situates these 
practices within its own historical narrative, replete with its own telos of rupture, revolution, and 
the loss of innocence. As such, historical theory has elaborated its own history of cultural 
historiography. But these elaborations too have a history. This paper considers a number of 
theory-driven accounts of cultural historiography, which situate it within a specific historical 
narrative about its origins. That narrative consists in a vision of radical rupture, distinguishing 
the ‘new cultural history’ both from prevailing modes of historical ontology and epistemology 
up until the end of the twentieth century, and most importantly, distinguishing it from earlier 
variants of cultural historiography as it was practiced in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. This paper describes the narrative of rupture that has imbued theoretical views of 
cultural historiography and examines the history of their elaboration; Secondly, it proposes that 
this narrative may itself be inappropriate, and suggests an alternative narrative about why 
earlier forms of cultural historiography have not commonly been seen as continuous with its 
current expressions. It argues that several genealogical tentacles connected older forms of 
cultural historiography to the newer variants, and that these connections cannot be assimilated 
within the telos of epistemological rupture that is typically invoked to describe the “linguistic 
turn”. Finally, a set of geo-political and institutional contexts are elaborated to explain the 
sensation of rupture reported by many cultural historians as, alternatively, the product of a 
series of nationalist hostilities and disciplinary exclusions from the late nineteenth century until 
after World War Two. Cultural historiography’s apparent ‘newness’ can better be understood 
as a late-twentieth-century myth generated by both historical theorists and by cultural 
historians themselves, which has served to instantiate a new scholarly identity for historians as 
theory-sophisticates in the ambiance of post-structuralist university humanities cultures of the 
western world.  
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This paper concerns the historical temporality evoked by historical-theory scholars 
and cultural historians, in their accounts of the history of cultural historiography. 
These accounts have been marked by a striking insistence on rupture, allowing the 
‘new’ cultural histories of the late twentieth century onwards to be conceived as 
unprecedented in their scope and theoretical sophistication. There is no denying that 
later forms of cultural historiography bear marked differences from earlier forms that 
were elaborated both practically and theoretically throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, the US, France 
and Finland, among other places; later forms have been indelibly marked by late 
twentieth-century movements in the humanities and social sciences, ranging from 
those associated with the structuralist and post-structuralist currents in their translation 
from French to Anglophone forms of engagement, to the Geertzian shift in 
anthropological thought toward ‘thicker’ modes of cultural description. However, one 
element largely imported without scrutiny from post-structuralist modes of thinking 
has been an overemphasis on ‘rupture’ in how cultural historians and historical 
theoreticians have imagined cultural historiography’s own past. This paper does not 
attempt to survey exhaustively all examples of earlier cultural historians, but rather 
emphasises those who specifically elaborated a theoretical account of cultural historical 
epistemology. It also does not attempt to survey exhaustively all those more recent 
trends that have informed late-twentieth and twenty-first-century cultural 
historiography, but focusses instead on how cultural historians and historical theorists 
have themselves historicised the practice.   
Convoluted though the title of this paper may be, it is perhaps necessary to 
describe this article’s peculiar form of contextualist historical account of something 
several levels removed from the simple practice of writing cultural history itself. 
Historical theory, as a mode of theoretical criticism, engages in both descriptive and 
prescriptive readings of historiographic practices, with a view to evaluating their 
epistemological value. But it also, often implicitly, situates these practices within its 
own historical narrative, replete with its very own telos of rupture, revolution, and the 
loss of innocence. As such, historical theory has elaborated its own history of cultural 
historiography. But these elaborations too have a history. This paper considers a 
number of theory-driven accounts of cultural historiography, which situate it within a 
specific historical narrative about its origins. That narrative consists in a vision of 
radical rupture, distinguishing the ‘new cultural history’ both from prevailing modes of 
historical ontology and epistemology up until the end of the twentieth century, and 
especially, distinguishing it from earlier variants of cultural historiography as it was 
practiced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
This paper firstly describes the narrative of rupture that has imbued theoretical 
views of cultural historiography and examines the history of their elaboration; 
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Secondly, it proposes that this narrative may itself be inappropriate, and suggests an 
alternative narrative about why earlier forms of cultural historiography have not 
commonly been seen as continuous with its current expressions. It argues that several 
genealogical tentacles connected older forms of cultural historiography to the newer 
variants, and that these connections cannot be assimilated within the telos of 
epistemological rupture that is typically invoked to describe the “linguistic turn”. 
Finally, a set of geo-political and institutional contexts are elaborated to explain the 
sensation of rupture reported by many cultural historians as, alternatively, the product 
of a series of nationalist hostilities and disciplinary exclusions from the late nineteenth 
century until after World War Two. Cultural historiography’s apparent ‘newness’ can 
better be understood as a late-twentieth-century myth generated by both historical 
theorists and by cultural historians themselves, which has served to instantiate a new 
scholarly identity for historians as theory-sophisticates in the ambiance of post-
structuralist university humanities cultures of the western world.  
NARRATIVES OF RUPTURE AND THE MYTH OF THE LINGUISTIC TURN 
While several rigorous historiographic studies clearly acknowledge earlier precedent 
forms of cultural history, a far more common vision of its origins as a late twentieth-
century radical innovation continues to dominate historical-theoretical accounts of it. 
Some recent advocates of cultural historical practice have themselves been complicit in 
this, with common claims made about its newness and postmodernism. Several 
important accounts of the origins of cultural historical approaches compare earlier 
antecedents to the more recent practices, nonetheless insisting upon a rupture between 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ cultural history and upon the incompatibility of the elitist style 
of Jacob Burckhardt’s 1860 Culture of Renaissance Italy, and the ‘new’ emphases on 
popular culture and textual hermeneutics in post-World-War-Two approaches.1  
Certainly not all recent scholarship about cultural history is neglectful of its past or 
careless in understanding its epistemological prerogatives. In fact, there are a number 
of superb recent studies that have eloquently and subtly surveyed methodological 
antecedence in cultural history’s own history of praxis. Donald Kelley’s detailed work 
considers the strong place of the old movement of cultural historians within the wider 
history of historical scholarship.2 But Kelley does not appear to consider the possibility, 
1 Jacob Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassikerverlag, 1989 
[1860]). The work of Peter Burke is a particularly rich exploration of the theme of popular culture in 
history, which he takes to distinguish fundamentally his practices from those of Burckhardt: Peter Burke, 
Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, 3rd edition (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
2 Donald R. Kelley, Fortunes of History: Historical Inquiry from Herder to Huizinga (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003). 
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elaborated in this paper, that cultural historiography may have a more specific and 
continuous history of epistemological orientation of its own, that might be 
distinguished as a clear thread woven throughout the history of historians which he 
traces more generally. Similarly, John Docker and Ann Curthoys have examined the 
relationship of Jacob Burckhardt to other nineteenth-century historiographic traditions 
but do not pursue the fate of cultural historiography across its history in the way they 
do in relation to other historiographic trends.3 Peter Burke too considers earlier 
examples of cultural history practice in some detail and across a several volumes.4 But 
throughout these richly reflective studies, Burke pays rather light attention to the way 
earlier historians understood their epistemological approaches, and instead mostly 
situates them in broad social contexts, examining their practical methodological tools 
and their subject-choices as the ground for evaluating their usefulness (or rather, the 
limits of it) as exemplars for the present. The rejection of the old cultural 
historiography is then elaborated in some detail in Burke’s opus, though in recent 
years he has somewhat softened this attitude of distancing, and recognized that the late 
twentieth-century ‘newnesss’ of recent cultural historiography may have been 
overstated.5  
Throughout the 1980s and 90s, it was reasonably common to see assertions by 
cultural historians and historical theorists, of cultural historiography as an entirely 
novel approach invented sometime around 1980. Mark Poster remarked in 1997 that a 
“new genre has emerged among historians, this one called ‘cultural history’,”  and 
which he viewed as radically destabilizing the opposing positions of histories of high 
and low culture, equated to intellectual and social history respectively.6 It was also, 
more understandably, common to find descriptions of cultural historiography as new 
relative to particular national contexts. Richard Biernacki, for example charted the 
emergence of cultural history in Australia as a field that “took shape in the nineteen-
eighties as an upstart critique of the established social, economic and demographic 
histories.”7 That statement is perhaps not erroneous in so far as it relates one of the 
ways in which cultural historiography found its place in Australian historiographic 
3 Ann Curthoys and John Docker, Is History Fiction? (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2006), pp.69-76. 
4 Peter Burke, Varieties of Cultural History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); Peter Burke, What is Cultural 
History? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).   
5 Peter Burke, “Strengths and Weaknesses of Cultural History,” Cultural History , vol.1 no.1 (2012), pp.1-13. 
6 Mark Poster, Cultural History and Postmodernity: Disciplinary Readings and Challenges (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), pp.3-9. 
7 Richard Biernacki, “Method and Metaphor After the New Cultural History,” in Hsu-Ming Teo and 
Richard White (eds), Cultural History in Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2003), p.62. 
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practices. However, it does imply that within the nation, historiographic trends emerge 
in isolation from international influence - that we each reinvent historiographic 
innovations for ourselves in parallel fashion, and without reference to examples in 
other places. Might it be, instead, that we inherit approaches by diffuse influence, such 
that it is difficult to be aware of their complex webs of origin? Likewise we may inherit 
narratives about those past practices that are infused with a certain mythological telos.  
Donald Kelley’s work is particularly attentive to the problem of historiographic 
forgetting and reinvention, and graciously critical of those claims to innovation that 
ignore past examples.8 Similarly, Bonnie Smith has made an elegant corrective to 
assumptions about women’s history as a twentieth-century de novo invention, noting its 
important amateur practice in European and Asian cultures since the 11th century 
BCE.9 As Smith shows, historical studies by and about women were among those 
which late nineteenth-century professional historians demarcated as amateur and 
unworthy of the status of a systemic knowledge (Wissenschaft in German or Science in 
French).10 Smith’s corrective might equally be applied to the forgetting of the old 
cultural history – like the old women’s histories, cultural histories were abundantly 
produced by non-professional historians in the 19th century, including many by 
women, and their demarcation as amateur histories, not the true scientifique or 
wissenschaftliche kind of study, was undoubtedly part of how those within the university 
institutional culture came to excise them from professional historians’ disciplinary 
norms.  
The re-invention of both women’s history and cultural history then, overrode their 
exclusion by the several generations of history’s institutional instantiation, but that 
previous erasure also produced an ignorance of the earlier forms, resulting in 
assumptions of the later iterations’ novelty. But the claim to newness and revolution 
cannot be explained merely as a form of forgetfulness. The old cultural history is 
indeed frequently enough invoked to remind all current practitioners and theorists that 
the twentieth century did not invent the very idea of the thing. In fact the old cultural 
history frequently features in accounts of why the new forms are so revolutionary – it is 
the backdrop for that statement of rupture that marks the announcement of ‘historical 
theory’ as the critical suspension of credence in the discipline of history’s naturalistic 
methods. 
8 Kelley, Fortunes of History, p.304. 
9 Bonnie G. Smith, “Gender I: From Women’s History to Gender History,” in Nancy Partner and Sarah 
Foot (eds) The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory (London: Sage, 2013), pp.266-281. 
10 See also Bonnie G. Smith, The Gender of History: Men Women and Historical Practice (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
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The intellectual historian Ian Hunter provides a vision of the ‘history of theory’ 
that is taken here to provide support for an alternative view of the history of cultural 
historiography via its relation to the emergence of historical theory. Hunter sketches a 
series of broader trends that might fruitfully elucidate both historical theory’s 
emergence, and stemming from it, the reconfiguration of cultural historical inquiry as 
a post-structuralist and post-modern set of practices. These trends, further help to 
explain the persistent telos implied in assertions of the ‘linguistic turn’ and the 
‘revolution’ of ‘new’ cultural history, which might be viewed as foundational myths for 
the identity of both historical theory as it is currently constituted, and of the ‘new’ 
cultural history since the late twentieth century. In Hunter’s narrative, the Davos 
disputation between Heidegger and Cassirer in the Swiss Alps in 1929 marked the 
translation of German university post-Kantian metaphysics into a language of self-
transformative transcendentalist scholarly personae, which then became exportable 
beyond the rather arcane local context in which they were generated, and later 
translated further into the forms of literary and hermeneutic critique in the 
deconstructionist version of Heideggerian metaphysics espoused by Derrida in his 
John Hopkins University address of 1966.11 This, according to Hunter, is how ‘theory’ 
as a particular kind of scholarly work on the self, was constituted as an international 
multi-disciplinary phenomenon. Derrida’s reconfiguration of the contest between 
Heidegger and Cassirer as the post-structuralist revolution against structuralism, 
produced an ethics of transcendence that demanded the critical suspension of 
credence in all naturalistic grounds of knowledge, including the methods of historical 
inquiry that had solidified in twentieth-century universities throughout the western 
world.  
Historical theory’s espousal of post-structuralist and post-modern metaphysics thus 
emerged as an offshoot of this suspension, in which historical naturalism could be 
transcended via a turning-inwards upon the self, toward a use of theory as something 
itself ‘outside history’, and which can be used to ascertain phenomenological truths 
about the character of historical inquiry. A countervailing current, however, has 
continued to entertain post-Kantian metaphysical concerns of the kind that predated 
the deconstructionist translation of Heidegger versus Cassirer (or with Husserl), 
producing the split between historical theory and philosophy of history, with various 
11 This address was published as Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences,” in Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donatio (eds),The Structuralist Controversy: The 
Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1972), pp.247-72. See Ian Hunter, 
“Scenes from the History of Poststructuralism: Davos, Freiburg, Baltimore, Leipzig,” New Literary History, 
vol. 41 (2010), pp.491-516. And also Ian Hunter, “The Time of Theory: The Return of Metaphysics to the 
Anglo-American Humanities Academy,” Postcolonial Studies vol.10 (2007), pp.5-22.  
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intermediary figures, such as Frank Ankersmit, spanning between the two; 12 or 
alternatively producing analytic philosophical accounts of historiography, such as 
those of Arthur Danto and Patrick Gardiner.13 A fourth divergent trend, within which 
the current paper might be situated, has continued to treat historical inquiry, and 
indeed even historical theory, as objects of contextual historicity – effectively 
abstaining from theoretical performance in preference for naturalist description. Many 
forms of the latter generate rigorous scholarship that seeks to elaborate appropriate 
dispositions of present historians toward the past via a historicist appreciation of the 
discipline’s trans-disciplinary and epistemologically pluralist origins.14 But many other 
examples of, ostensibly historiographic modes of inquiry in the field of historical 
theory, reiterate linear views of progress in cultural historical practice and 
theorization, toward a hubristic assertion of novelty and radicalism on ontological 
grounds.  
Cultural historiography’s advocates have generally performed fusions of 2 or more 
of these exercises; for instance, positing on the one hand, post-structuralist 
hermeneutic claims about the primacy of language, in addition to refutations of realist 
and objectivist underpinnings in disciplinary professional historiography; additionally 
constructing historical narratives of cultural historiography’s own emergence, in which 
the telos of naïve past, rupture and revolution is rehearsed. These views have meant 
that practicing cultural historians, by centering their analyses on close reading of 
textual sources (always within the comfort zone of hermeneutic historical inquiry 
generally), are able to position themselves as “theory intensive” in relation to the 
concerns of historical theory, producing the expectation among historical theorists to 
12 See Frank Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
13 Arthur Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1965); Patrick 
Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). 
14 It would impossible to do justice to this large body of scholarship here. Some good  examples, from 
among many, include: Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical 
Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John Zammito: A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: 
Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Mark 
Phillips, On Historical Distance (New Haven: Yale University Press: 2013); See also, in addition to those 
already cited in this article: Herman Paul, “Distance and Self-Distanciation: Intellectual Virtue and 
Historical Method Around 1900,” History and Theory, vol.50 (December 2011), pp.104-116. Lutz Raphael, 
“The Implications of Empiricisms for History,” in N. Partner and S. Foot (eds) The Sage Handbook of 
Historical Theory (Sage, 2013), pp.23-40. Jan van der Dussen, “The Case for Historical Imagination: 
Defending the Human Factor and Narrative,” in N. Partner and S. Foot (eds) The Sage Handbook of 
Historical Theory (Sage, 2013), pp.42-66; and Alan Megill, “What is Distinctive about Modern 
Historiography?” in Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer (eds), The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-Cultural 
Approaches to Historiography. Essays in Honor of Georg G. Iggers (New York: Berghahn, 2007), pp.28-41. 
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find natural allies among cultural historians.15 And indeed advocates of cultural 
history’s so-called ‘linguistic turn’ have tended to read French post-structuralist 
philosophy as implying an unavoidable rejection of historical methods and ideals 
inherited from nineteenth century historicist traditions, such as objectivity, archival 
reading and practical realism, even though most recent forms of cultural historical 
inquiry itself show no significant departures from the narrative styles, and research 
methodologies implied by these forms.  
There were indeed elements of the kind of intellectual persona described by 
Hunter implied in the self-conscious claims to postmodern and post-structuralist 
history that began to appear in the nineteen-eighties in the work of Joan Scott, Lynn 
Hunt, Alan Muslow, and especially Keith Jenkins. But in historical debates, the 
assertion of the irruption of the “new cultural history” against other kinds of historical 
inquiry, and the rejection of the old cultural history and its continuous influence, have 
also been rehearsed by those critical of the recent trends toward cultural 
historiographic approaches. The theme of rupture then has served two separate, 
indeed opposing, purposes. On the one hand it enabled an excitement among some 
historical theorists and self-realized cultural historians about the “revolution” in 
historical studies in the late twentieth century; on the other, it has provoked anxieties 
about a sudden threat of recent textualist approaches to the realist and objectivist 
foundations of the discipline. 
As the cultural historian Stephen Garton noted in the early 2000s, there was still a 
common perception in Australian academia that cultural history stands in relation to 
social history as post-structuralism does to structuralism.16 Indeed the even more 
ambiguous term “postmodern” was been applied to the practice of cultural history by 
some of highly respected historiographers, such as Georg Iggers, Norman Wilson and 
John Tosh.17 In a range of texts on the topic of cultural historiography, there were 
assertions about it as a new epistemological innovation in approaches to the past, part 
of a new “cultural” or “linguistic turn”, and the sign of a loss of commitment to 
historical objectivity, to realism, and hence to academic integrity. Such accounts by 
professional historiographic historians typically attributed this “new” field to the 
15 See all of “Part II: Application: Theory-Intensive Areas of History” in Partner and Foot (eds) The Sage 
Handbook of Historical Theory, pp.221-396. 
16 Stephen Garton, “On the Defensive: Poststructuralism and Australian Cultural History,” in Teo and 
White, Cultural History in Australia, pp.52-66. 
17 Georg Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century; From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge 
(Middletown CT, 1997), 133; Norman Wilson, History in Crisis?; Recent Directions in Historiography, second 
edition (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005), pp.90-91; John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, Fourth 
Edition (Harlow: Pearson and Longman, 2006), p.304. 
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convergence of history and cultural anthropological studies, and reference the late 
French Annales School, feminist theory, postcolonial studies and French post-
structuralism as key influences, all occurring since the end of the Second World War. 
The gender historians Joan Scott and Lynn Hunt claimed cultural history specifically 
as a “postmodern” practice, and as a new approach to the past that, in privileging the 
self-conscious study of texts, radically overturned “empiricist” assumptions about the 
existence of an historical truth beyond those texts.18 Mark Poster made this same 
assertion throughout his monograph on Cultural History and Postmodernity of 1997.19 This 
view of cultural historiography appeared consistently to assume that textually focused 
historiographic approaches, in recognising the unavoidable textual mediation of reality 
limiting we can know about the past, we must embrace the radical denial of reality 
outside the text, and further abandon historical ethics such as the ideal of objectivity. 
This kind of leap from constructivism to relativism was importantly criticized in a large 
body of scholarship in the history of philosophy, and notably by a number of historical 
meta-thinkers, in the first half of the twentieth century, such as Carl Becker, E.H. Carr 
and R.G. Collingwood, who all referred to the relativisitic leap as a kind of 
“skepticism” that might readily be discounted.20 Realism remains a continuing zone of 
contention in contemporary historical theory, as played out in a series of debates 
between Frank Ankersmit and John Zammito from the late 1990s and continuing.21 
But bizarrely, in much of the historical theory produced by or about cultural 
historians, the relativist position was assumed to be a self-evident conclusion following 
from a Derridean hermeneutic constructivism.  
Without reference earlier discussions about historical facts in the work of Becker, 
Carr and Collingwood, claims associating cultural history with relativism and the total 
rejection of any value of ideals of objectivity were made both by those celebrating the 
new cultural history and by those worrying about its emergence throughout the 1980s 
and 90s. The work of the self-proclaimed postmodern historian Keith Jenkins provides 
18 Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York,: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp.1-
11; Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds), Beyond the Cultural Turn; New Directions in the Study of Society and 
Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp.2-4; Also: Lynn Hunt (ed), The New Cultural 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
19 Poster, Cultural History and Postmodernity. 
20 See Carl Becker, “What are Historical Facts?” The Western Political Quarterly, vol.8, no.3 (September 
1955), pp.327-340; Edward Hallett Carr, What Is History? (London: Penguin Books, 1961); Robin G. 
Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946). 
21 See John H. Zammito, “Post-Positivist Realism: Regrounding Representation,” in Partner and Foot 
(eds) The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory, pp.402-422; Also, Frank H. Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth and 
Reference in Historical Representation (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
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a clear example of how this argument has often been made by invoking Derrida’s 
statement, “il n’y pas de hors-de-texte”, quoted from De la Grammatologie, as a new and 
radical metaphysical rejection of the apparently old-fashioned bourgeois modernist 
assumption that reality might exist outside what we construct it to be.22 Similarly, the 
term “postmodern”, understood here as relativistic, was attributed to cultural 
historiographic epistemology by the historiographers Georg Iggers, Norman Wilson 
and John Tosh.23 It is surprising to see a scholar of such deep erudition and knowledge 
of the history of historical inquiry as Georg Iggers, in his survey of Historiography in the 
Twentieth Century; From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge, attributing the 
emergence of recent cultural histories to an incursion of critical theory into the 
discipline. But it is also understandable given the dissociation of the new cultural 
historians in this period, from earlier iterations of its theorization and practice. The 
Derrida mistranslation appears in Iggers’ view as well, presented as the thinker most 
directly responsible for inspiring the idealist metaphysical assertion that “there is 
nothing outside/beyond the text,” which was assumed to underlie all forms of cultural 
historiographic methodology and the broader “linguistic turn” (in which forms of 
intellectual history might also be grouped) more generally.24  
Derrida’s statement that there is no “outside-the-text” was probably not intended 
as a metaphysical challenge to historical realism, which was certainly not one of 
Derrida’s targets.25 The sentence, badly translated, has nonetheless been fixated upon 
as an example of how the “new” cultural history’s emphasis on text and language 
reflects a metaphysical postmodernism in which there is no admission of a reality 
outside historic texts and our interpretation of them, implying the need to abandon 
any notion of practical objectivity.26 Similar misapprehensions have characterized 
22 Keith Jenkins, “No Going Back: A Case for Postmodern History,” Teaching History, vol.84 (1996), p.37; 
See also Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan and Alun Munslow (eds), Manifestos for History (London: Routledge, 
2007). Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967), p.159. 
23 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, p.133; Wilson, History in Crisis?, pp.90-91; Tosh and Lang, 
The Pursuit of History, p.304. 
24 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century,p.132. 
25 That point has been well made by a number of scholars who note that if a truly non-sensical anti-
realism had been Derrida’s intention then a very different French expression would have been used. See 
Max Deutscher, “Chasing After Modernity: Some Friendly Words for the Postmodern,” in In Sensible 
Judgement (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp.187-200; See also: Lawrence D. Kritzman, Brian J. Reilly, 
M.B. DeBevoise, The Columbia History of Twentieth-Century Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), p.500; Also: Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p.135. 
26 Mark Poster has remarked upon that fixation too: Poster, Cultural History and Postmodernity, p.41; The bad 
Derrida mistranslation is cited also in: Tosh and Lang, The Pursuit of History, p.296; Iggers, Historiography in 
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debates within the American historical academy about the status of intellectual history 
– another profoundly hermeneutic variety of historical inquiry. As Peter Novick notes, 
the common view of intellectual historians as philosophical relativists has often formed 
the pivot for claims of what Novick terms a “misleading invidious distinction” between 
an objective historiography responsible to the authentic truth of the past, and a text-
focused approach assumed to have abandoned historicist all commitments.27  
Joan Scott framed the constructionist practice of bracketing-out assumed 
categories (namely gender) as a post-structuralist innovation, albeit within the 
framework of a labor-focused “social” rather than “cultural” history.28 Part of that 
concern - with the constructed nature of linguistic terms, and with the consequent 
need for cultural researchers to suspend credence in them - derives from Husserl’s 
elaboration of the epoché as espoused in his transcendental phenomenological works of 
the nineteen-thirties, and transmitted through the development of continental theory 
in the work of Merleau-Ponty, Foucault and Derrida, finally to arrive in the form that 
Scott absorbed through her fascination with French post-structuralism.29 Partly also, it 
derived from Derrida’s translation of Heidegger, as sketched in Ian Hunter’s account 
of the history of theory. 
The implications of occulting identification with the old cultural history are far 
more consequential than is generally acknowledged. The first implication is that it 
supports the broader, teleological claims commonly found in historical theory, about 
historiography progressing toward ever greater forms of sophistication over linear 
time, through the insistence that past attempts to conceive cultural historical 
epistemology were naïve, undeveloped and hence are irrelevant to current, more 
complete, forms of innovation in historical methods. This narrative telos is displayed, 
for instance, in the recent work of the philosopher of history Frank Ankersmit, whose 
2013 chapter in the Sage Handbook of Historical Theory refers twice to the “naïve” times of 
historical theoretical understanding prior to the “complete revolution” of Hayden B. 
White, and congratulates present scholars for the “language-wise adults we have 
become since the linguistic turn”.30 This example is precisely interesting as it occurs in 
the context of a paper which argues otherwise for a return to something Ankersmit 
the Twentieth, p.9; Also in Jenkins, “No Going Back,” p. 37. The general interpretation of Derrida as anti-
realist is even more widespread among the less informed of both his fans and detractors. 
27 Novick, That Noble Dream, p.6. 
28 Scott, Gender and Politics of History, pp.1-10. 
29 See Hunter, “The History of Theory”. 
30 Frank Ankersmit, “Historical Experience Beyond the Linguistic Turn”, in Partner and Foot (eds) The 
Sage Handbook of Historical Theory, pp.427-28.  
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terms “experience” which he argues predated the ‘linguistic turn’ and can be found 
suggested in the work of Gadamer, Johan Huizinga and Walter Benjamin. Ankersmit’s 
argument then is that the past of both historical philosophy and cultural 
historiography might usefully inform present understandings; nonetheless, he begins 
the chapter with a lengthy rehearsal of the more familiar narrative of naïve and 
infantile historical thinking ruptured by a ‘linguistic turn’, after which it has basked in 
the continuing crest of its mature consciousness.  
GENEALOGICAL TENTACLES CONNECTING THE OLD AND NEW FORMS OF 
CULTURAL HISTORY 
Cultural historical philosophers such as Wilhelm Dithey, Ernst Cassirer and Hans-
Georg Gadamer provide the most direct links between the ‘old’ (nineteenth-century 
Germanic) forms of cultural historical epistemology and the rise of modern continental 
philosophy, which in turn has been clearly influential on the ‘new’ (late twentieth-
century Anglophone forms). This genealogy might be considered as one dimension of 
the continuity between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. Cultural historiographic thinking in the 
model of Jacob Burckhardt and Karl Lamprecht, and the philosophy they engaged 
with, was born out of engagement with both Hegelian and Kantian forms of historicity 
and the competing emphases on context and interpretation these were seen as 
producing. In the work of Wilhelm Dilthey that produced the re-interpretation of 
Friederich Schleiermacher and the elaboration of a theory of humanities 
hermeneutics.31 Dilthey read the work of Jacob Burckhardt in his elaboration of 
historical hermeneutics.32 Karl Lamprecht was most influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
reading of Kant and his emphasis on psychology as an aspect of the human sciences, 
in opposition the more common neo-Kantian fixations that proliferated in both 
French and German intellectual circles in the late nineteenth-century, and which 
tended to produce narrower forms of definition of the human sciences based on a 
simplistic understanding of the natural sciences.33 European university history 
departments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century became dominated by 
this style of neo-Kantianism, manifesting in a positivistic Comptian vision that was 
conflated with English empiricism in the mode of Francis Bacon and John Locke and 
31 Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works III: The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, eds R. A. 
Makkreel and F. Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works 
IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History, ed Rudolf. A. Makkreel and Frijhof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
32  Ibid, pp.271-278. 
33 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Second Edition, trans Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004), pp.216-217. 
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David Hume, and restated as a supposedly “Rankean” vision, producing a notion of 
history as a precise science or Wissenschaft – both terms that referred to the systematic 
qualities of knowledge, but which had stronger associations with the natural sciences in 
the English-language forms compared to the German and French expressions.34 
Cultural historians such as Karl Lamprecht specifically rejected that view of Kant and 
history in favor of Dilthey’s humanist-inspired vision of historical knowledge as 
Verstehen (understanding) and an alternative reading of Kant as an epistemological 
rather than metaphysical philosopher.35 This discussion, in turn challenged and 
complexified in the work of philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, continued to influence 
European cultural historians in the early to mid twentieth century in - particular 
Reinhart Koselleck, who studied with Gadamer in Heidelberg from 1947-53.36  
Burckhardt’s direct followers also vigorously continued an ongoing elaboration of 
his approach in the early twentieth century, as well as a critique of its failings. One 
group of such historians in Germany congregated around the idiosyncratic personality 
of Aby Warburg. At the turn of century Warburg travelled to the US and undertook 
ethnographic research into Native American cultures, in particular the Hopi Indians 
of the South-West, and developed his own unique style of “iconology”, a system of 
reading images and symbols within a kind of anthropological contextualisation.37 
Warburg was a student of Karl Lamprecht, who had in turn closely studied the work 
of Jacob Burckhardt and credited Burckhardt with inspiring his own fascination with 
the pursuit a holistic account of past cultures.38 The genealogy up to this point then is 
incontestably apparent in the strong tradition of German scholarship on the history of 
culture throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
But it is also proposed here that another continuity is implied by the relationship 
between French Annales School founders Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, who were 
without doubt, aware of the second generation of Burckhardtian scholars in Germany, 
namely the ill-fated Karl Lamprecht, and shared with him mutual friendships with 
both the Belgian cultural historian Henri Pirenne, with the Dutch cultural historian 
34 Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge: Philosphy, Science, and History since Hegel, trans William H. 
Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p.226. 
35 Roger Chickering, Karl Lamprecht: A German Academic Life (1856-1915) (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities 
Press, 1993), p.244. 
36 Reinhart Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2006). 
37 Aby Warburg, The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity: Contributions to the Cultural History of the European Renaissance, 
trans D. Britt (Los Angeles: Getty Centre, 1999); Aby Warburg, “A Lecture on Serpent Ritual,” Journal of 
the Warburg Institute, 4 (1939), pp.277-292. 
38 Chickering, Karl Lamprecht, p.53; Karl Lamprecht, “Was ist Kulturgeschichte? Beitrag zu einer 
empirischen Historik,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft Bd.1 (1896), pp.75-150. 
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Johann Huizinga, and with the French polymath philosopher Henri Berr. The Annales 
School are considered, in many recent accounts of cultural historiography’s history, to 
represent the moment of rupture – the beginning of something genuinely new that can 
be taken to distinguish radically late twentieth-century forms of cultural historiography 
from the nineteenth-century forms.39 But the considerable continuities between the 
early Annales historians and the late Burckhardtians suggest that this image of rupture 
is not as appropriate as is often assumed. 
The Kulturgeschichte tradition exerted a powerful influence on thought currents 
throughout twentieth century history, lingering in the interstices of newly instantiated 
institutional disciplines of sociology, philosophy and history. It is proposed here that by 
paying attention to these interstices, we might retrieve an alternative narrative about 
the old cultural historiography as a continuous hermeneutic humanities trans-
disciplinarity that indirectly nourished the revival of late twentieth-century cultural 
historical practices. The still commonly espoused view that history has itself only 
become inter-disciplinary and textually hermeneutic since the end of the Second 
World War, through the influence of other disciplines and of new domains of inquiry 
(cultural anthropology, literature, social theory, feminism, postcolonial studies) is 
unsustainable in light of a study of early twentieth century thinkers influenced by 
nineteenth century cultural historical scholarship. Historians – the old cultural 
historians that is – were deeply enmeshed in several of the most influential genealogies 
of twentieth-century continental thought; genealogies that were important in the 
articulation of the new cultural history in its relationship both to post-structuralism 
and to cultural anthropology, though often unbeknownst to new cultural historians 
themselves. The claim here is not that early cultural historical thinkers ‘anticipated’ 
later trends. We would only be tempted to indulge such wonder at the seemingly 
proto-post-structuralism of Huizinga, or proto-Geertzianism of Aby Warburg if we 
ignored the ways their approaches emerged from early twentieth-century dialogues 
between philology, history, anthropology and psychology, and the way those multi-
disciplinary and cross-cultural fusions suffered in the environments of university 
professionalization and of inter-continental war. The point is not to say that the new 
cultural history is older than we think, but rather to consider how the earlier project of 
elaborating a polymath hermeneutic cultural historical epistemology was decisively 
pushed to the margins of disciplinary history somewhere in between the two world 
39 See for instance, the editors’ remarks in Anna Green and Kathleen Troup (eds), The Houses of History: A 
Critical Reader in Twentieth-Century History and Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 
pp.87-88; also Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution, The Annales 1929-1989 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990). 
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wars, and how its survivors and relics continued nonetheless to influence the 
intellectual trends that enabled its later re-emergence.  
The relationship between early cultural historians and the emergence of modern 
philosophical hermeneutics may not have been unidirectional. Gadamer’s theory of 
play (Spiel), articulated in Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method) of 1960 bore many 
elements in common with Johan Huizinga’s famous work, Homo Ludens: On the Play 
Element of Culture of 1938, which Gadamer referenced.40 That text, as is well known, was 
probably one of the most salient works of inspiration for the field of cultural and 
historical anthropology. Clifford Geertz no doubt read Huizinga’s work.41 And it is 
Geertz above all who is often blamed (or praised) for the influence of cultural 
anthropology on historians such as Roger Chartier, Peter Burke, Robert Darnton, 
Lynn Hunt, and numerous other cultural historians of the late twentieth century.42 
Max Weber’s engagement with the Burckhardt, as discussed by Reinhard Bendix, 
suggests another entry through which the old cultural history infiltrated the emergence 
of sociological thought.43 While these are but fleetingly sketched correspondences, they 
are numerous and credible enough to suggest that earlier cultural historiographic 
thinking belongs in the heart of the development of twentieth-century cultural sciences 
and their hermeneutic complexification - a process of theoretical integration that has 
occurred continuously via broad polymath intellectual exchange, beginning at the end 
of the nineteenth century, and which continues still.  
It is striking that discussions of the epistemological approach and methodological 
tools implied in a cultural historiographic framework have been a feature of the work 
of cultural historians throughout the twentieth century. Karl Lamprecht theorized on 
the matter (in 1896), as did Johan Huizinga (in 1929) and later E.H. Gombrich (in 
1969), and Carlo Ginzburg (1989).44 Lucien Febvre too wrote a considerable amount 
about historiographic method, as I discuss later in this chapter; and Peter Burke, in 
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 169; Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2000 [1938]). 
41 Cifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures; Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
42 Ronald G. Waters, “Signs of the Times: Clifford Geertz and Historians,” Social Research, vol. 47 
(1980), pp. 537–556; Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: History, Culture, and Text,” in Hunt, The New Cultural 
History, pp.12–13. 
43 Reinhard Bendix, Embattled Reason: Essays on Social Knowledge, vol 2 (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1989), pp.185-194. 
44 Lamprecht, “Was ist Kulturgeschichte?; see also Johan Huizinga, Cultuurhistorische verkenningen (Haarlem, 
H. D. Tjeenk Willink en Zoon, 1929). 
Ernst H. Gombrich, In Search of Cultural History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); and also Carlo 
Ginzburg, Clues, Myths and the Historical Method (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
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publishing several works on the practice and principle of cultural history has behaved 
entirely consistently with the continuous genealogy of cultural historians as 
epistemological thinkers. As Roger Chickering notes, it was not generally the case in 
nineteenth-century Germany for cultural historians to develop complex theoretical 
accounts of their approach to knowledge.45 Had it not been for the bitter intellectual 
struggles into which they were drawn towards the end of the nineteenth century, as a 
result of both the ‘Rankean’ revival and the rise of nationalism, that theoretical apathy 
may well have remained the norm. In the environment of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century debates within European academies about the new imperatives of 
professionalized history, cultural historians were uniquely demanded upon to account 
for the discrepancies of method, approach and object that their interdisciplinary 
crossings produced, as well as for their tendency to dissent from nationalist agendas. 
The multi-disciplinary crossings they attempted were not without problems. Warburg 
and Lamprecht inherited from Jacob Burckhardt a quasi-Hegelian vision of historical 
eras as defined by a unified Zeitgeist infusing all aspects of culture, a position that was 
difficult to reconcile with the new expectations of Kantian historical methodologies. 
But while they both tended to consider culture in excessively unitary terms, they did 
not as in Hegel’s conception, imagine it situated teleologically within the march of 
progress of humanity toward greater enlightenment. It is not that their own studies are 
necessarily exemplary for current models of cultural history, so much as their 
elaboration what Kulturgeschichte entailed prompted complex forms of engagement from 
influential philosophical thinkers, and proved to be generative of multiple forms of re-
evaluation by subsequent cultural historians.  
The cultural and linguistic “turn” concept in recent historical theory typically 
associates it with new, “postmodern” or post-structuralist innovations. But the broader 
epistemological concern with understanding conceptual and linguistic structures as 
limiting or mediating knowledge about the world was precisely a very nineteenth-
century preoccupation, and derived from even older traditions of philology with their 
origins in biblical exegesis. The interrogation of historical subjectivity and a critique of 
pretensions to knowing the “facts” of the past was also a core concern among historical 
philosophers at the end of the nineteenth and turn of the twentieth century.  
Immanuel Kant’s concept of Transcendental Logic as elaborated in the Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) of 1781 had specified a distinction between phenomena 
and cognition, emphasizing the unknowability of things beyond their appearances to 
45 Chickering, Karl Lamprecht, p.90. 
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human perception, and opening new lines of thought into cultural epistemology.46 
This, broadly speaking, was the character of the engagement with Kant by polymath 
thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, and later, Gadamer and Cassirer, and further, by 
the early cultural historians Karl Lamprecht, Johan Huizinga and Ernst Gombrich.  
The theorization of what historical knowledge entails, of what historical truth 
exists, and of the relationship between history and other forms of knowledge were 
generally pressing and central concerns to a range of European, especially German 
thinkers throughout the nineteenth century. Both Kant and Hegel’s writings about the 
meaning of historical knowledge were known to most scholars whose work cut across 
either history, philosophy, science and the emerging social and psychological sciences 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, and they tended to approach the question 
of historical fact and knowing through the rubric of the Kant-Hegel divide or 
variations of their fusion. Indeed the looming presence of those two iconic figures of 
Enlightenment philosophy haunted historians from Burckhardt to Lamprecht, as well 
as all manner of other historically-minded thinkers from Marx, to Comte, to Dilthey, 
to Weber, to Durkheim.47 Questions of historicism cut across the divide since both 
Hegel and Kant were repeatedly cited as the origin of historicist moves. Kant could be 
maneuvered to articulate an historicism grounded in a recognition of the distinction 
between being and knowledge, producing the determination to see the past according 
to itself and not through the hopes and ideals of the present. Hegel gave inspiration to 
forms of historicist thought, as in Burckhardt’s claim to locate the unique Zetigeist of the 
Renaissance, or in Lamprecht’s notion of successive eras, which made the past 
different to our own reality, a whole unto itself, though matching another time and 
place inevitably at the completion of a cycle of the eras.48  
GEO-POLITICAL AND DISCIPLINARY RUPTURES 
Following the cues of recent innovations in Cambridge School intellectual history, this 
paper aims for a sketch of something broader than a strict intellectual genealogy, in 
recognition of the need to consider generational cultural ideals, institutional contexts 
46 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London: Meiklejohn and Holden, 
1905 [1781]), pp.45-50. 
47 See David Boucher, Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying Ideas (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1985), pp.14-16. 
48 Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge; Philosophy, Science, and History Since Hegel, trans W. H. Woglom 
and C. W. Hendel (New Haven, 1950), p.286 
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and intellectual personae in the history of historiographic thought.49 In the case of 
cultural history old and new, there are several extra-genealogical contexts that help to 
explain the perceived ruptures, both between political and cultural historians at the 
turn of the twentieth century, and between the old Germanic cultural historiography 
and the later French and Anglophone variants. With the marginal place occupied by 
the early cultural historians at the edges of emergent academic disciplines, and sitting 
uncomfortably in their relation to the nationalist tensions that gripped the cultures in 
which they lived between the First and the Second World Wars, the old cultural 
historians were never strongly positioned to secure the place of their tradition in the 
institutionalization of historical studies in European universities. French and German 
rivalries throughout the interwar period contributed to the Annales School scholars’ 
claims to innovation, both divorced from the German Kulturgeschichte movement, and 
reacting against what they viewed as the remnants of Ranke’s influence on their 
teachers, Charles Siegnobos and Charles-Victor Langlois.50 
The account sketched here does not aim to discount or contest the importance of 
post-World-War-Two intellectual trends such as cultural anthropology and French 
poststructuralist theory on the recent re-emergence of cultural history. Rather, it does 
suggest a need to reconfigure the relationship between cultural history old and new, 
and between cultural history and the rise of theory. Cultural historians first inspired 
European critical theory’s reflections on historical epistemology, and not vice-versa. Of 
particular interest here, the work of Lamprecht, Burckhard and Warburg was critically 
engaged with by Dilthey, Cassirer and Agamben, all philosophers who were important 
figures in the genealogy of European continental philosophy and theory in each of 
their successive generations spanning the late nineteenth century to the mid 
twentieth.51 Contrary to the view that cultural history was pioneered (badly) by 
Burckhardt and then forgotten about as a possibility of knowledge until its radical 
49 Ian Hunter and Conal Condren, “Introduction: The Persona of the Philosopher in the Eighteenth 
Century,” Intellectual History Review, vol.18 (2008), pp.315-317; Conal Condren, “English Historiographical 
Revisionism, ‘Cambridge School’ Intellectual History: Some Aspects of the Problem of 
Contextualisation,” International Journal of Public Affairs, vol.2 (2006), pp.19-28. 
50 Charles-Victor Langlois et Charles Seignobos, Introduction aux etudes historiques (Paris: Hachette, 1898). 
See also Hans Dieter Mann, Lucien Febvre la pensée vivante d'un historien, Cahiers des Annales 31 (Paris, 1971). For 
further discussion of the Febvre and Bloch’s generational orientation see Alison M. Moore, “What 
Became of Cultural Historicism in the French Reclamation of Strasbourg After World War One?” French 
History and Civilization vol.6 (2014), pp.82-91. 
51 For Dilthey on Burckhardt see Dilthey, Selected Works IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History, pp.271-278; 
For Cassirer on Lamprecht and Burckhardt see: Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, 242-289. For Agamben 
on Lamprecht and Warburg see: Georgio Agamben, “Aby Warburg e la scienza senza nome,” in La 
potenza del pensiero: Saggi e conferenze (Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2005), pp.123-146. 
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poststructuralist re-invention in the nineteen-eighties, an alternative account is 
suggested here - that cultural history has represented a continuous presence since its 
self-conscious emergence in the nineteenth century, and while it has lacked 
institutional security, and has hovered as a decentered presence around places of 
methodological innovation, its multiple genealogical tentacles remaining entangled 
within and throughout some of twentieth-century Europe’s most significant 
epistemological currents.  
Burckhardt proved to be a point of reference, both inspirational and critical, for 
continental European cultural and historical philosophers across the early twentieth 
century. Burckhardt’s follower Karl Lamprecht was associated with the early French 
Annales historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Fevbre prior to World War One, and also 
influenced Carlo Ginzburg and the Italian “micro-history” tradition which in turn had 
an important impact on American postwar cultural historical studies due to 
Ginzburg’s visits to the US. Ginzburg wrote about the methodology of both Aby 
Warbug and of Ernst Gombrich.52 Ginzburg’s work in turn influenced both the New 
Literary Historicist tradition, namely Stephen Greenblatt, and also Giorgio Agamben, 
who also wrote about Warburg.53 Gadamer in turn had a major influence on Reinhart 
Koselleck and the entire German “history of concepts” tradition.54 Karl Lamprecht’s 
work also features as an example in the epistemological writings of Ernst Cassirer.55 
Cassirer’s analysis of the Burckhardt tradition, written in the nineteen-thirties, showed 
how an emphasis on texts in cultural context threw up compelling questions about the 
role of historical sources in creating the historian’s vision of the past, and about the 
need to think of texts not as reflecting the past but as mediating our knowledge of it. 
Cassirer valued the scholarship of Ranke and Croce far more than any of the cultural 
historians he discussed, but his epistemological reflections were nonetheless inspired by 
consideration of the approaches of Burckhardt and Lamprecht.56 
The attacks on Lamprecht in the German academy at the turn of the twentieth 
century were vicious, and a number of Lamprecht scholars have suggested that by 
triggering such adverse reactions to his scholarship, Lamprecht might even be seen as 
52 Carlo Ginzburg, “Da Aby Warburg a Ernst Gombrich: Note su un problema di metodo,” Studi 
medievali, vol.7 (1996), pp.1015-1065. 
53 Agamben, “Aby Warburg e la scienza senza nome.” 
54 See John H. Zammito, “Koselleck’s Concept of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History,” History 
and Theory, vol.43 (2004), pp.124-135. 
55 Ernst Cassirer, “History,” in Man and Culture, Hamburger Ausgabe, Gesammelte Werke, 23, (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2006), pp.215-217. 
56 Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, pp.242-289. 
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a “retarding” influence on the uptake of social scientific innovations that had begun to 
fascinate French-speaking scholars of the early twentieth century, especially Henri 
Berr, Henri Pirenne, Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch.57 This is somewhat disingenuous 
though, since it was the Methodenstreit reaction against Lamprech, not Lamprecht 
himself, which rejected what was viewed as inter-disciplinary incursions into in the 
discipline. The French-speaking scholars’ relative receptivity to various forms of 
knowledge also cannot be divorced from the influence of Lamprecht. Bloch and 
Febvre consulted closely with the elder Pirenne in the planning stages of the Annales 
journal. Pirenne in turn had been heavily influenced by Karl Lamprecht. His 
correspondence with Lamprecht and collaborations with him throughout the eighteen-
eighties and nineties have been well established by Geneviève Warland. Lamprecht’s 
own account of the value of anthropological thought for historians was ambivalent – 
on the one had he derided much German scholarship in this field as “purely 
descriptive”, while also suggesting that comparative anthropology could help elucidate 
early Germanic culture.58  
Lamprecht’s work represented an intriguing juncture in the disciplinary battles 
that surrounded the definition of historical professionalism in late nineteenth-century 
Germanic Europe. These battles point toward part of the reason why the old cultural 
history was unable to secure its intellectual progeny. Lamprecht was a renowned 
Saxon medievalist in his own time and taught at the universities of both Marburg and 
then Leipzig in the last decade of the nineteenth century and first decade of the 
twentieth. He was attacked by a number of his contemporaries for his multi-
disciplinary approach to the Middle Ages and early modern era. Late in his career, in 
1909, he founded his own Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte in Leipzig. His 
magnum opus entitled, ambitiously Deutsche Geschichte spanned a vast array of topics on 
social relations, natural geography, psychology and literature.59 Debates about this 
work among his compatriot disciplinary colleagues marked a profound rupture in 
German historiography in which the broad culturalist approach to the past that 
Lamprecht exemplified became officially anathema to professional historians. In the 
infamous Methodenstreit (methodology quarrel) that raged in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, political historians such as Georg von Below, Dietrich Schäfer and 
57 Fritz Ringer, Max Weber’s Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences (Harvard University 
Press, 1997), p.24; Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890-1920 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991), pp.263-282. 
58 See Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), p.203. 
59 Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte (Freiburg im Breisgau: R. Gaertners, 1905). 
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Friederich Meinecke attacked Lamprecht’s claims to innovation, his undisciplined 
approach and his use of sociological and psychological models of analysis in studies of 
past culture. Most dubiously, Lamprecht advanced the idea of cultures having a kind 
of psychology, a Volksseele or Völkerpsychologie - collective psyche - an idea that Meinecke 
ridiculed for its speculative and romantic foundations which he counterpoised to the 
Rankean study of political events that dominated his own work and stood at the centre 
of German historiographic thinking in the period.60  
In part that debate might best be understood as a kind of culture war. As Charles 
McClelland noted, academic culture in the Bismarck era was dominated not only by a 
prevailing nationalism, but also by a new value placed on specialization as the mark of 
scholarly integrity.61 Lamprecht represented neither of those things, and though he 
made his greatest fame through a study of Germanic civilization on the assumption of 
there being some obvious organic essence to that nationally constituted historical 
designation, the scope of his work spanned a number of European cultures, several 
eras, and many different disciplinary tools. He was both cosmopolitan and polymath 
in a time of nationalism and specialization. In fact, German academic cultures were 
marked by a growing pressure toward nationalism throughout the Wilhelmine period. 
Around the time of the First World War, both German and French intellectuals 
underwent considerable pressure from journalists, political opponents and colleagues 
to manifest an unambiguous nationalism – a pressure that Lamprecht, like Emile 
Durkheim in France, tried to resist while maintaining a softer cultural patriotism. 
Meinecke’s critique of Lamprecht in particular focused on these kinds of questions: 
Cosmopolitanism was a lower stage in the evolution of culture toward nationalism, 
and a conception of history in the style of Ranke represented the pinnacle of academic 
maturity.62 Lamprecht, with his careless mysticism, his fascination with other cultures, 
and his multi-disciplinary borrowings helped Meinecke to see how nationalism and 
historical specialization might be linked. As Roger Chickering noted, “In Meinecke’s 
eyes, the development of national consciousness corresponded to the maturation of 
German historiography.”63 Hence while Lamprecht was greeted warmly as a visiting 
lecturer in France and in the US, he received a cold reception among his compatriots 
right up to his death in 1915. In the years leading up to First World War, Lamprecht 
60  See Kelley, Fortunes of History, pp.304-306. 
61 Charles E. McClelland, State, Society, and University in Germany 1700-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), pp.315-316. 
62 Friederich Meinecke, Cosmpolitanism and the National State, trans R. B. Kimber (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970 [1908]). 
63  Chickering, Lamprecht, p.261. 
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promoted views about the need for a more cosmopolitan diplomacy among European 
nations, and in 1914, although he joined his colleagues in signing the Manifesto of 93 
which declared the patriotic commitment to the war of some of Germany’s most 
respected academics, he died practically disgraced by his ambivalence toward the 
question of national allegiance.64   
Lamprecht’s own students and others who pursued similar polymath 
historiographic approaches thereafter tended to be based not in Germany but in 
Florence where the majority of their research materials lay, reflecting their fascinations 
with the Italian ‘Renaissance’. But the eccentric Aby Warburg, the eldest son of a 
wealthy Jewish banking family from Westphalia, was considerably more financially 
independent than most scholars, and remained in Germany to establish a massive 
library of early modern Italian resources that later formed the basis of the 
Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliotek Warburg founded in Hamburg in 1921. He had 
accumulated a similarly impressive knowledge base, undertaking his art-history 
dissertation with scholars based at the University of Strasbourg in the eighteen-
eighties, and attending classes on cultural history with Lamprecht in Leipzig. His 
archival collection attracted a network of scholars inspired both by the historically 
contextual approach to Renaissance art in the mode of Jacob Burckhardt, and by the 
analyses of form developed by the Vienna school of Renaissance and medieval art 
historians in the first fifteen years of the twentieth century.65  
In many respects, Warburg’s own work on early modern Italian culture was a 
radical revision of Burckhardt’s celebratory adulation of the Renaissance, as 
Warburg’s iconological studies of early modern Italian paintings claimed that they 
exhibited a dynamic conflict between reason and passion to which he ascribed the 
Nietzschean dichotomy of Apollo and Dionysius.66 The Renaissance for Warburg was 
a defining moment of modernity, though not the triumphant modernity of a Hegelian 
imagining, but a rather fin-de-siècle counter-Enlightenment view of civilization as 
always teetering between brilliance and doom in its rational trade with primitive 
essences. Here one can see the common heritage of early cultural history and of the 
later Frankfurt School social theory’s visions of civilization, with the latter’s uptake of 
Nietzschean Greek cosmology and claims to a universal dialectic of chaos and order.67 
64 Kelley, Fortunes of History, p.309. 
65 Ernst H. Gombrich, Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography, Second Edition (Chicago: Phaidon, 1986). 
66 Warburg’s relationship to Nietzsche was however ambivalent. See Mark A. Russell, Between Tradition 
and Modernity: Aby Warburg and the Public Purposes of Art 1896-1918 (New York: Berghan Books, 2007), p.26. 
67 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans J. Cumming (New York: 
Continuum, 1972 [1947]), pp.93-95. 
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Late in his life, Warburg was also treated by the psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, 
whose writing Michel Foucault read closely.68 
Following Warburg’s death in 1929 and with the arrival of Nazi regime, the 
Warburg library’s keepers, with the help of the American embassy in Hamburg, 
moved the massive Kulturwissenschaftlicher Bibliotek to Britain in 1933, and many of the 
Vienna School art scholars who relied on the remarkable resources within that library 
moved with it.69 Hence it was that the Austrian art historian Ernst Gombrich became 
closely affiliated with the Warburg institute, and later acted as director of it from 1959-
1976. On November 19th 1967 Gombrich delivered a lecture at Oxford University in 
which he articulated what cultural history represented in relation to the precedence of 
Jacob Burckhardt. This lecture was then expanded into a small book entitled In Search 
of Cultural History, published by Oxford University Press two years later.70 Here 
Gombrich provides an account of cultural history as precisely the kind of 
“culturization” of historical knowledge that recent visions have attributed to post-
structuralist influences. The approach, as Gombrich explained, was one of drawing 
connections across the kinds of texts commonly compartmentalized according to 
professional academic disciplines. In his explanation of the necessity to study 
languages, literatures, artworks and philosophies of an historical era, Gombrich 
extolled something like a vision of the inter-disciplinarity that is often assumed to be 
attributable to the new, late twentieth-century movements such as the emergence of 
cultural studies.71 But in Gombrich’s version of it, this style of scholarship was not 
called inter-disciplinary, but “polymath”, and he related it to the common continental 
humanist educational approach that inspired countless European scholars of the 
Renaissance throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. The epistemological 
culturization of history, so often viewed as a recent innovation, Gombrich shows us, 
had long been an integral part of cultural historiographic approaches among a certain 
kind of European intellectual  - the  kind that Karl Lamprecht, Johan Huizinga and 
Aby Warburg exemplified in each of their respectively flawed ways.  
The Warburg historians were able to conceive history in this way in part because 
they derived their approaches from Burchkardt, whose conception of history pre-dated 
the emergence of professional academic disciplines; and from Lamprecht who insisted 
on the multi-disciplinarity of knowledge in the face of mounting pressure towards 
68 See Michel Foucault, Ludwig Binswanger, Dream and Existence (Studies in Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry), trans J. Needleman (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1986). 
69 Gombrich, Aby Warburg: An Intellectual Biography. 
70 Gombrich, In Search of Cultural History. 
71 See for example, Gilbert B. Rodman, “Cultural Studies and History,” in Partner and Foot (eds), The 
Sage Companion to Historical Theory, pp.342-353. 
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disciplinary compartmentalization and specialization. Cultural history then was not so 
much inter-disciplinary, as trans- and pre-disciplinary, and it attempted to remain so 
even as disciplinary boundaries became increasingly rigid, as the Methodenstreit 
indicated. In so doing it alienated itself from the emergent historical establishment in 
Europe. 
From this perspective then, the view of cultural history as new and as postmodern 
on the basis of its textual constructivism, or on the basis of its challenge to historical 
objectivity, would both appear to indicate a puzzling amnesia or suggest rather that 
some extraordinary disavowal of earlier intellectual innovations has occurred in the 
development of historical theory in the late twentieth century. Early cultural historians 
did indeed appear to consider that there was a difference between metaphysical and 
epistemological types of claims. Both Johan Huizinga and Ernst Gombrich wrote 
about that exact question.72 But in the later formations of the ‘new’ cultural history as 
necessarily postmodern, there appeared an assumption that such histories necessarily 
recognize “nothing outside the text”. 
Other cultural historians also engaged richly with both Burckhardt and with 
Lamprecht’s work while being deeply critical of their unitary view of culture. Johan 
Huizinga, the Dutch historian of medieval Europe whose career spanned the end of 
the First World War until his death under Nazi imprisonment in 1945, wrote a chapter 
on the theory of cultural history in relation to Burckhardt’s work in his study of 
Cultuurhistorische verkenningen (Cultural Historical Knowing) of 1929.73 Huizinga had 
begun his intellectual career as a comparative linguist and philologist. His interests 
spanned a wide array of different cultures, and he taught at the universities of 
Groningen and Leyden both as an Oriental language and culture scholar, and later as 
a scholar of Dutch medieval and early modern history. He was an erudite polymath, 
and with the wide span of his cultural knowledge, and the combination of linguistic 
and historicist interests, and he was able to elaborate a vision of cultural history 
informed by a sensitivity to the unique language content of historical texts, studied 
through literary techniques of close-reading.74 Another consequence of that nexus of 
concerns was that he approached history against the trend of national frameworks and 
instead concordant with the appellation of cultures as they appeared in the given past 
72 Gombrich,  In Search of Cultural History; Huizinga, Cultuurhistorische verkenningen. 
73 Huizinga, Cultuurhistorische verkenningen. 
74 Close reading and textual interrogation are particularly strong features of Johan Huizinga, Herfsttij der 
middeleeuwen: studie over levens- en gedachtenvormen der veertiende en vijftiende eeuw in Frankrijk en de Nederlanden 
(Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1969 [1919]). 
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subjects’ own linguistic constructions.75 In recent views of cultural history, the features 
of linguistic sensibility and close textual reading in cultural historiographic approaches, 
as discussed earlier in this paper, have commonly been viewed as the product of 
French post-structuralist influences throughout Anglophone humanities academe in 
the last two decades of the twentieth century. But Huizinga’s use of those techniques 
predated the post-Derridean “linguistic turn” by about fifty years.  
Huizinga rejected the view of the Renaissance as a coherent era and critiqued the 
notion of a unified Zeitgeist (spirit of the age), but he defended Burckhardt for his 
definition of the historical object as “peoples, social groups, cultural figures, motifs, 
themes, symbols, concepts, ideas and styles...”.76 He paid homage to Burckhardt’s 
polymath approach and poured scorn on the narrow conception of history as political 
events that continued to dominate among continental professional historians in his 
lifetime. He welcomed the possibilities of sociology in historical writing remarking that 
“Thanks to recent trends in the theory of knowledge....history can never be normative 
and does not have to be.”77 He was particularly scathing toward the “Rankean” 
dogma that dominated academic history departments in central and northern Europe, 
arguing that they had misused Ranke’s claim to writing history “wie es eigentlich 
gewesen” (as it really was), turning it in an adage of the “inevitability of the 
preconceiving ‘it’” - creating an arrogance that blinded historians to the reality of their 
inevitable subject position.78 He referred to the importance of understanding 
“contexts” in a way that prefigured both Cambridge School intellectual history and 
new historicist approaches to cultural history in literary studies later in the century. 
Most importantly, he argued that historicist objectivity was not a naïve metaphysical 
assertion, but an instrumentalist epistemological ideal. It defined the historian’s gaze as 
the “desire to find out how a certain thing ‘really happened’,” – as a movement toward 
that ideal, but not as a secure acquisition. For Huizinga the term historicism was a 
longing that created a particular kind of historical consciousness rather than a 
hubristic pretense to attaining a direct knowledge of past reality.79 His position 
demonstrated precisely both how textualist histories might maintain historicist 
commitments, and how realism might operate instrumentally rather than 
75 As for instance in Johan Huinzinga, Erasmus and the Age of Reformation, trans F. Hopman (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984 [1924]).  
76 Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas; History, the Middles Ages, the Renaissance, trans James S. Holmes and Hans 
van Marle (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1960), p.65. 
77 Ibid, p.67. 
78 Ibid, p.26 
79 Ibid, pp.39-43. 
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metaphysically, informing an epistemological underpinning rather than an ontological 
stance.  
It is difficult to know where Huizinga’s subtle mind may have taken the question of 
cultural historiography if, like Marc Bloch, he had not died a premature death during 
the Second World War. In relation to these two significantly influential cultural 
historians, the invasion of Europe by the Nazi regime represented the most obvious 
rupture of cultural historioriogphy’s development as a result, not of postmodernism, 
but of war. That war also had an impact upon the Warburg approach to cultural 
history. In forcing Warburg’ followers to flee the continent, as well driving the 
considerably larger Vienna School art historians out of Austria, both movements 
united as related ex-pat intellectual refugees in England, resulting in a fusion of their 
ideas in which art history came to hold a more dominant role than it had done in 
approaches of Lamprecht and Warburg. The characterization of the old cultural 
history as preoccupied uniquely with “high art” has been one unfortunate 
consequence of that elision.  
THE FRANCO-GERMAN RUPTURE 
Around the same time that Karl Lamprecht was being ostracized from the German 
historical academy prior to the First World War, a (now renowned but then obscure 
and young) French historian, Lucien Febvre began his own exploration of the place of 
cultural psychology in historiography that was not unlike Lamprecht’s notion of 
Volksseele. One important distinction was that Febvre’s version rejected the mystical 
framework of the nation as the basis of collective psyche, and he was later specifically 
critical of that approach.80 Given Lamprecht’s positive reception in France during 
Febvre’s youth, it is credible to situate Febvre in relation to the 
Burckhardt/Lamprecht genealogy, and to reconsider the relationship of that tradition 
to the Annales School which Febvre helped to found along with Marc Bloch in 1929, 
and which he led in the postwar era, following Marc Bloch’s death while fighting in 
the French Resistance under the Nazi Occupation. The connection is further 
suggested by the fact that Bloch spent the year from 1908-9 in Germany, and followed 
the lectures of Karl Lamprecht at Leipzig.81  
80 Throughout his life Febvre remained committed to a cosmopolitan outlook, and rejected the notion of 
long histories constituted in national terms, declaring “cardinal virtue of the historian” to be “Ce refus de 
prendre comme postulat une sorte de nécessité perpétuelle des nations et des formations politiques, 
supposées permanents de droit à travers les siècles.” Lucien Febvre, Combat Pour l’Histoire (Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1952), p.98. 
81 Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century, p.52;  
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In several respects Febvre’s epistemological concerns strongly resembled those of 
the Burkchardt, Lamprecht and Huizinga, and it is undeniable that he read all of 
them. Febvre, like Burckhardt, emphasized the historian’s subjectivity as an inherent 
factor in historiographic understanding, and as a necessary limit to any claims about 
historiographic practice as objective.82 In that respect he was very much part of the 
intellectual current among cultural historians like Lamprecht and Warburg, who 
rejected the clichés about Ranke that were reiterated by the dominant trend of 
historical thinking in Germany, France, the UK and the US. In 1933 Febvre 
denounced the spirit of specialization that had become entrenched in interwar French 
academic disciplines.83 He engaged with the work of Johan Huizinga, writing a preface 
to a new French translation in 1955 of Huizinga’s study of Erasmus.84 In his 1952 work 
Combat Pour l’Histoire (History’s Struggles) he referred to Huizinga’s work repeatedly, 
critically, but in a manner suggesting generative stimulation.85 Like Huizinga, he had 
taken what was useful to him from the Burckhardt tradition and rejected what was not. 
He did not emulate either Burckhardt or Huizinga’s general approach but he 
nonetheless engaged with their framework and was unmistakably nourished by the 
cosmopolitan and polymath counter-culture it represented in his generation of 
historical intellectuals. Of course, Febvre referred to the work of many other 
historians, sociologists and psychologists, and it might be objected here that his 
occasional mention of the Germanic tradition proves nothing about its deep influence 
on his ideas. But it is also reasonable to consider that Febvre probably, consciously or 
unconsciously, minimized their impact on his formation, both during the interwar 
period when French-German rivalry was culturally pervasive and extended far into 
academic life, and further still after the Second World War when the humiliation and 
horror of the Nazi Occupation made it fairly unpalatable in France to credit the 
contribution of German traditions to any major degree.  
Bloch and Febvre were based at the University of Strasbourg. No location could 
better represent the rupture between French and German cultures, lying as it does in 
the heart of that territory which Imperial Germany designated Alsace-Lorraine and 
which was so perennially contested throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
82 Febvre, Combat pour l’histoire, pp.18-33; Jacob Burckhardt, Judgements on History and Historians, trans 
Harry Zohn (Indianaolis : Liberty Fund, 1999), p.xiii. This collection of Burckhardt’s lectures delivered at 
the University of Basel derives from the period 1865-1885, and was collated by his student Emil Dürr in 
1929. 
83 Febvre, “Contre l’esprit de specialité. Une lettre de 1933,” in Combat pour l’histoire, pp.104-106. 
84 Lucien Febvre, “Préface,” in Johan Huzinga, Erasmus, trans V. Bruncel (Paris : Gallimard, 1955). 
85  Febvre, Combats Pour l’Histoire, p.215; pp.226-9; p.300. 
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– French territory in 1789, then German again after the French defeat in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870; French again after the German defeat in 1918, annexed by the 
Nazis in 1940, made part of France again in 1944. When Strasbourg was returned to 
the French state under the Treaty of Versailles, there was an expulsion of all German 
academics who had worked there since 1870, and a movement en masse of French 
scholars now found position there – among them both Febvre and Marc Bloch.86 A 
new divide emerged in this time between French and German scholars who had 
previously begun a fruitful dialogue. In his later writing Febvre, born and raised in 
Nancy in the Lorraine, referred still with great resentment to the German presence in 
Alsace-Lorraine from 1870 to 1918.87 He and Bloch both fought in the First World 
War.88 Following their return from combat there appears to have been no further 
contact with the German historical academy with whom they had previously been 
associated. In the aftermath of the Vichy occupation, French historians moved even 
further away from German-influenced culturalist approaches and the Annales School, 
now reconstituted firmly on economic and statistical foundations.  
Here then already there is another reason to think that cultural historiography of 
both old and new kinds has a shared history from its first articulation in the ideas of 
Burckhardt through to the present, via the ideas of Lamprecht and Warburg in the 
early twentieth century, up to the recent elaborations of the late twentieth century in 
the work of Lynn Hunt and Peter Burke, with their obvious debt to the Annales 
school.89 Strangely, Burke does not consider that there is any continuity from 
Burckhardt to the Annales, and neglecting the relationship of Bloch and Febvre to 
Lamprecht and Warburg, he constructs the history of the Annales as a “French 
historical revolution” that reacted against a century of continuous domination by 
empiricist political historians.90 While it is certainly true that cultural historians 
nowhere occupied a position of dominance before the very end of the twentieth 
century, it is also possible that following the genealogy from Burckhardt to Lamprecht, 
there was a further link from Lamprecht to the Annales.   
86 Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Les Annales d’Histoire Economique et Sociale. Correspondance, tome 1, 1928-1933, ed 
Bertrand Müller (Paris : Fayard, 1994), p.xix. 
87  Febvre, in Combats pour l’histoire, p.177. 
88 Georges Huppert, “Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch: The Creation of the Annales,” The French Review, 
vol.55 (1982), p.511. 
89 Lynn Hunt, “French History in the Last Twenty Years: The Rise and Fall of the Annales Paradigm,” 
The Journal of Contemporary History, vol.21 (1986), pp. 209-224. 
90 Peter Burke, The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School 1929-1989 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990), pp.8-11. 
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If we examine the opinions of Lamprecht that circulated both in his own time, and 
which prevail in recent accounts of him, then it is not difficult to see why a distancing 
has occurred. Cassirer, Roger Chickering and Georg Iggers all agreed that Lamprecht 
was a poor exemplar for the opening of historiography toward cultural concerns and 
that the only real posthumous value of his work is “little more than curiosity” 
(Chickering), or primarily of interest for what his fate helps us to understand about the 
politics of historiography in Wilhelmine Germany (Iggers).91 He had exciting ideas, but 
he executed them badly.  And yet something about his work, like that of Burckhardt, 
was irresistible to debate and critique, keeping the possibilities of cultural history 
generatively alive at the margins of European historical thought during the interwar 
period.  
The old cultural history was a “failed paradigm”, and “found few emulators” 
according to Roger Chickering, Donald Kelley, and other scholars of the history 
twentieth-century ideas.92 But the ongoing and vibrant academic culture of the 
Warburg Institute in the London School of Advanced Study suggests that this “failure” 
was not so generalized. Perhaps part of the difficulty in appreciating the influence of 
the old cultural history lies in its lack of blindly devoted emulators. Certainly, few have 
called themselves Burckhardtians, Lamprechtians, Warburgians or Huizingans; and 
yet these thinkers have certainly not lacked for engagement and re-interpretation. 
They have all been heavily criticized, and yet their approaches were profoundly 
interesting for many different kinds of historically-minded scholars throughout the 
twentieth century. For those of us who write cultural histories or appreciate reading 
them, we owe these scholars at least our acknowledgement of their precedents. 
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